The Economics of the Big Deal: The Bulls, the Bears and the Farm by deVries, Susann
Against the Grain
Volume 29 | Issue 1 Article 7
February 2017
The Economics of the Big Deal: The Bulls, the
Bears and the Farm
Susann deVries
Eastern Michigan University Library, sdevries@emich.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/atg
Part of the Library and Information Science Commons
This document has been made available through Purdue e-Pubs, a service of the Purdue University Libraries. Please contact epubs@purdue.edu for
additional information.
Recommended Citation
deVries, Susann (2017) "The Economics of the Big Deal: The Bulls, the Bears and the Farm," Against the Grain: Vol. 29: Iss. 1, Article 7.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7771/2380-176X.7706
18 Against the Grain / February 2017 <http://www.against-the-grain.com>
And since the number of vendors offering Big 
Deals is limited, these two or three dozens of 
outlets need to find ways to acquire content 
for “their” deal.
Why should this hunger for content now 
pose a problem to learned societies and smaller 
publishers?  The step from a process of digi-
tization to a state of digitality is characterized 
by a changing sales pattern.  In the past com-
missioning content from a learned society and 
selling it was a synchronized process, with the 
subscription year of a specific journal being the 
genetic code of the business relation between 
the society, the publisher and the library.  To-
day, societies still commission journal content 
for a period of three or five years to larger 
publishers.  However, the model of passing 
this content on to libraries has changed.  With 
their multi-year deals, libraries often make 
a commitment to buy content and in reverse 
expect content to be delivered for the term they 
paid for.  If the publisher signs that deal in year 
two or three of the agreement they have with 
their society partner, they are selling something 
they effectively did not contract.
The problem is even worse when the large 
publisher converts his holding-based Big Deals 
into a database deal.  These database deals 
cause a society journal’s pricing structure to be 
dismantled and the journal effectively loses its 
economic valuation.  Imagine a case in which 
a society decides to publish independently and 
wants to pull its journals out of the Big Deal. 
Not only does the society have to deal with the 
organizational build-up of a sales force and 
technological capabilities needed to provide 
libraries with an adequate service level, but it 
also has to re-constitute pricing and discount 
structures that fit its own size and needs.
It is evident that societies and smaller 
publishers have to make their bets.  But why 
should libraries care?  So far, they have had a 
schizophrenic relationship with the Big Deal. 
While most libraries did not support the idea 
of buying scholarly content in large bundles, 
many of them did.  While the reasons for 
subscribing to Big Deals are manifold — elim-
ination of selection processes, more choice for 
researchers, better cost-benefit ratio — libraries 
continued to subscribe to journals from smaller 
publishers, certainly for quality reasons, but 
also to support alternative structures.
The TRANSFER Code of Conduct, in its 
latest version 3.0 from 2014, addresses a lot 
of the technical concerns around the transfer 
of journals from one publisher to another, and 
it does so by now in a manner that is adequate 
to digital products.  However, the business 
side remains an open desideratum.  There are 
already a few mechanisms in place that address 
the fact that publishers don’t sell journals as 
units any longer, but provide access to masses 
of content.  Therefore, mechanisms are needed 
to assign the value inherent in a collection of 
content pieces (or alternative volume of usage) 
independently of all the meat of the Big Deal 
around it.  By this means, customers could 
allow for journals to be pulled out of packages 
during the period of a contract to protect their 
interests.  This mechanism would also ensure 
that publishers would not replace content 
essential to a library’s patrons with other, less 
relevant content, just to fulfill their volume 
commitments.
In turn, the standing practice in many 
licensing agreements between publishers and 
libraries is that publishers are almost forced 
to commit to the delivery of content, which 
they did not even secure contractually, for the 
term of their respective agreement with their 
customer.  This might appear to be a negligible 
issue, but given the fact that there are also larg-
er packages with STM journals with up to 200 
titles and several thousand articles that might 
move houses one day or another, it is sensible 
for librarians to take precautions. 
As an interesting side-note, the lock-in 
effect is not only positive for those larger pub-
lishers that control major market segments. 
It is not just learned societies that find it 
structurally and increasingly difficult to move 
out of the Big Deal.  It has also become really 
difficult for larger publishers to sell assets out 
of their portfolio that might not be in their 
strategic focus any longer, as their content is 
so tightly intertwined with the business mod-
els they support.  And if one shares the view 
that in the advent of Open Access valuations 
of traditional journal assets will most likely 
not increase any further, this poses a risk to 
publishers as well.
All in all, the Big Deal has been a great 
business model for quite some time, but it 
requires on both sides — libraries’ as well as 
publishers’ — what its name implies:  size. 
Large institutions in research and higher 
education may be served well by it, as are 
large publishers.  After all, they invented it 
as a response to customer demand.  However, 
the Big Deal’s prospects are doomed, as the 
budget situation in libraries is undergoing 
structural shifts and as publishers’ hosting 
technology is getting commoditized.  Smaller 
publishers — not-for-profit as well as com-
mercial ones — are well advised to evaluate 
their options and choose in time, whether they 
want to get rolled up in a database business 
or retain a certain level of control over their 
customers.  What it takes is libraries that 
support plurality of models in the market by 
making appropriate purchase decisions.  
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One of the fundamentals of econom-ics is the study of supply and demand.  There are 
different ways to approach 
this subject.  Adam Smith 
outlined in Wealth of Nations 
(1776), the concept of a free 
market with lack of inter-
vention and a laissez-faire 
approach to the economy. 
John Maynard Keynes in 
his book, General Theory 
of Employment Interest and 
Money (1936), pointed out 
that markets tend to react 
very slowly to changes in the 
equilibrium (especially with price changes) 
and intervention is sometimes the 
best method to get the economy 
back on track.  We seem to be in 
somewhat of a standstill with 
Big Deal journal packages. 
I would argue that libraries 
and the publishing world 
have been too focused on a 
free market approach and that 
we are quickly approaching 
a need to depart from the 
classical school of economics 
and swing our focus for a 
movement to a more Keynesian 
approach. 
The pros and cons of acquiring serial pub-
lications via the Big Deal have been discussed 
in depth since they started to appear in the 
90s;  which is appropriate because changing 
from an a-la-carte approach to the bundling of 
subscriptions means there is a lot of money at 
stake.  According to the ACRL 2013 Academic 
Library Trends and Statistics, academic librar-
ies typically spend 68.7% of their materials 
budget on ongoing resources purchases, with 
doctoral degree granting institutions spending 
on average 74.3% ($6,305,337) and compre-
hensive degree-granting institutions 75.4% 
($774,701).  We’re talking billions of dollars, 
folks.  Publication companies want to sell jour-
20 Against the Grain / February 2017 <http://www.against-the-grain.com>
nal packages and libraries are predisposed to 
subscribe, but the question remains whether the 
future will sustain willing buyers of Big Deal 
packages in a fiscally challenged environment. 
Something has got to give.
The Triple Bottom Line (TBL), coined by 
John Elkington in 1994, is an accounting 
basis that has gained significant attention in 
the business sector.  Whereas the traditional, 
single bottom line only focused on profit, the 
TBL approach differs from profit-based or 
financial outlook to include social and ecolog-
ical measures for assessment.  I am proposing 
a slight twist to the TBL.  All libraries have to 
take into account the financial consideration, 
but we also have to take into account our so-
cial obligation to our patrons’ research needs, 
and we must develop a long-term sustainable 
approach to access when analyzing the pros 
and cons of purchasing any Big Deal.  Mul-
tiple dimensions and perspectives have to be 
taken into account.
Big Deal journal packages were supposed 
to be a help to libraries, but in the long run it 
seems to be an unsustainable model lacking 
budget flexibility.  The big question libraries 
are asking themselves is, how they can allocate 
increasingly shrinking fiscal resources to satis-
fy unlimited publication growth in academia? 
Can all parties come together and find a TBL 
where publishers, authors and libraries can 
make it financially feasible on all sides of the 
fence to support the furthering of intellectual 
thought and growth in a sustainable manner?  
Limitations and Challenges
The library budget is similar to a one-year 
financial bond between the governing body of 
the institution and the library in a non-public 
exchange to maintain ongoing operations.  The 
budget is fixed without a built-in contingency, 
nor a rainy day fund for emergencies.  What 
libraries pay to vendors is apparently on a slid-
ing scale and typically costs are perceived to be 
based on FTE and classification rank; but who 
exactly determines that cost?  There is a lack 
of transparency on pricing of journal packages 
without enacting The Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA).  We all want to know, what is con-
sidered to be reasonable?  What other models 
could be explored?  For example, at the end of 
a year, could a university qualify for a discount 
if they did not use a platform as heavily as had 
been expected for their Carnegie/FTE level? 
There ought to be more options.
On the flip side, the vendors expect a prof-
it.  I often hear from publishers the need for 
percentage cost increases due to the growing 
number of titles offered, rising costs to produce 
and so forth.  While the norm of percentage 
increases used to be in the double digits 15 
years ago, I am dismayed that vendors are con-
sistently asking for numbers above the standard 
inflation rate, during a time when academia is 
in a fiscal chokehold.  The demands for infla-
tionary rates are crippling libraries and forcing 
institutions to critically look at:  Options vs. 
Needs, Costs vs. Budget.  
In order to keep prices down (or at least 
predictable), vendors offer different types of 
incentives to lock in sales for the short term. 
Making multi-year commitments to Big Deals 
in order to get a better price over time is scary. 
You hope for the best and that all will go well 
at the time the commitment is made, but in the 
back of your head you know the future situa-
tion is a bit scary and it could very well end in 
tears.  Why is that?  As mentioned earlier, most 
libraries work on a year-to-year budget.  They 
cannot predict what future student enrollment 
will actually be, what state appropriations will 
look like (if a public institution), what the re-
turn on investments will provide and if budget 
cuts have to be made, whether or not they have 
to consider cutting staff lines in order to meet 
multi-year legal commitments with vendors. 
There are very serious consequences at stake if 
wrong decisions are made or unexpected dips 
in the economy force our hand.
Then there are the limitations of cost vari-
ation based on discipline.  I have yet to com-
prehend the inflexible and exorbitant pricing of 
science and medical journals, which are often 
cost prohibitive to many institutions.  Journals 
contain content that scholars and students want. 
Due to the nature of academic publishing, that 
exact same content (the results from a partic-
ular study or experiment) cannot be found in 
another journal.  These mini-monopolies put 
power in the hands of publishers, as scholars 
need access to that particular content at ex-
orbitant prices.  It’s kind of like the way that 
Netflix or HBO can control its subscription 
price.  If you want to watch House of Cards 
or Game of Thrones, you have to subscribe 
and they set the price.  While entertainment 
shows are a luxury and access to these shows 
are not considered to be a necessity, this is 
not the case with scholarly content.  Access to 
scholarly content is the social right from which 
to base further research in order to stretch the 
boundaries of intellectual thought.  This makes 
it very difficult for libraries to walk away from 
content, as most feel obliged to subscribe to the 
journals patrons demand.  
The Bulls, the Bears and the Farm
The massive consolidation of commercial 
publishing and library technology consoli-
dation is a significant development, limiting 
supply options.  Last year Rakuten purchased 
OverDrive, Bibliotheca bought 3M Library 
Systems North America and ProQuest ac-
quired Ex Libris.  To reference the traditional 
nursery rhyme, “so they all rolled over and one 
fell off.”  Now there are just a few in the bed, 
but I’m pretty sure not everyone is singing, 
“If You’re Happy and You Know It.”  In the 
meanwhile, libraries are diligently singing 
“Row, Row, Row Your Boat” while competi-
tion is being eliminated.  With the formation 
of monopolies, prices rise and the giants get 
to charge whatever they think the market will 
bear.  Remember the golden rule of negotiating, 
he who has the gold, sets the rules.  
Analysis of Holdings
With so much money at stake, both sides 
of the fence are producing data sets to aid 
with decision-making.  The development and 
growth of e-resources management systems 
(ERMs) to analyze Counting Online Usage of 
Networked Electronic Resources (COUNT-
ER) via the Standardized Usage Statistics 
Harvesting Initiative (SUSHI) to pull in cost 
information from publishers to determine cost-
per-download, all aid with analyzing the value 
of money spent and set acceptable thresholds 
from which to base seemingly sound decisions. 
People think if they can just do enough analysis 
and break everything down sufficiently, then 
they will make sound judgment calls.  Numbers 
don’t lie, right?  
However, Terry Bucknell in his 2012 arti-
cle “Garbage in, Gospel Out: Twelve Reasons 
Why Librarians Should Not Accept Cost-per 
Download Figures at Face Value” in The Se-
rials Librarian, makes a compelling case for 
challenging the reliability of the data which 
is collected as the numbers may or may not 
be comparable.  It becomes complicated in a 
New York minute if you are willing to delve 
into great depth and detail.  We all have to look 
at the data and determine if we are comparing 
oranges to oranges or apples to oranges.  
While we would all like to take a logical 
approach, even Spock had to admit that the 
Vulcan approach was not always the best 
approach.  Is strictly going by numbers the 
best way to go?  Spock had to embrace his 
normative judgment side, or human element, 
to also consider information from all sides 
based on past experiences.  What other factors 
come into play?  
Is your library purchasing leasing rights 
to journals or are you also getting archival 
privileges with your Big Deal?  Some may 
argue that if libraries are only getting annual 
subscriptions with just access rights, then 
it may be similar to leasing a car and prices 
should be lower.  For example, with some 
science disciplines where the last five years 
are the most downloaded, then there is no 
residual value to access rights like a car would 
have after the lease is up.  On the other hand, 
the social sciences and humanities depend 
greatly on long-term archival access, which is 
considered essential for scholarship.
A few libraries such as Southern Illinois 
University and the University of Oregon 
have left Big Deal packages and the rest of us 
are avidly watching their publications to see 
if they think they have made the correct call. 
More and more libraries are following suit as 
they feel the financial Vulcan death grip and 
have chosen to depend on interlibrary loan or 
on-demand article options such as Copyright 
Clearance Center’s Get It Now.  So the vicious 
circle continues. Libraries cancel subscriptions. 
Publishers see their subscriber numbers fall 
and to maintain or increase their revenues, 
they raise the subscription prices still higher.  
It seems that in the long run there needs to be 
cooperation for sustainability. 
What will your library do after considering 
all sides of the financial, social and sustainable 
factors?  How risk-averse is your institution? 
Are you going for a long-term strategy, or just 
a five-year outlook?  In the decision making 
process you will have to ask yourself:  are you 
a bull, a bear, a chicken or a pig?  
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A bull represents the attitude of an investor 
with an optimistic, “bullish” outlook.  A bear 
looks at the market pessimistically and has a 
grumpy, “bearish” outlook.  And then there 
is “the farm,” or the chickens and the pigs. 
Chickens are characterized by investors who 
are afraid to take risks and tend to see a low 
return on their investment.  Pigs on the other 
hand are the opposite of Chickens.  These are 
The Economics of the Big Deal ...
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high-risk investors are looking for a big score 
in a short length of time.  They tend to follow 
hot tips and invest without sound decision 
making.  Often, the bulls and bears reap profits 
from pigs because of the latter’s recklessness 
in investing.  Thus the old stock market saying, 
“Bulls make money, bears make money, but 
pigs just get slaughtered.”  
Taking the TBL approach when considering 
Options vs. Needs and Costs vs. Budgets relies 
on:  evaluating data, considering and setting 
value thresholds, balancing patrons’ wants 
along with mission of the library and factoring 
risk aversion in the current fiscal economy to 
arrive at sustainable decisions concerning Big 
Deal packages.  There is no easy answer.  As 
with investments, we all have to be diligent 
in watching the economy and assessing how 
the supply and demand will play out, for there 
are never any guarantees.  You may be a bull 
or a bear, but always learn from the chickens 
and pigs.  
continued on page 23
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Here is comfort for those on the verge of leaving Big Deals, solace for those who already have.  Whether you arrived at 
this juncture by principle or lack of principal, 
the message is the same: the survival of the 
academy is not at stake. 
Southern Illinois University Carbon-
dale’s Morris Library left three Big Deals 
over the course of 2009 and 2010.  Yet faculty 
continue to conduct research, publish, and 
teach their students, who continue to write 
their theses and dissertations and get their 
degrees.  Grants continue to be secured. 
People continue to come into the Library to 
use our resources.  All evidence indicates that 
subscriptions to entire publisher portfolios are 
not essential to the functioning of a modern 
research university.  Not that this serves as 
some kind of epiphany for higher education; 
SIUC, like every other higher education 
institution, functioned quite well for over a 
hundred years before the advent of the Big 
Deal — thrived, and even grew.  
SIUC is a modern research university, in 
the Doctoral University: Higher Research Ac-
tivity category, according to the 2016 Carnegie 
Classification.  We are not in the top tier, we 
are in the second tier.  This puts us in the same 
category with 106 other U.S. higher education 
institutions, including Auburn, Dartmouth, 
Oklahoma State, the University of Rhode 
Island, and the like.  
Our participation in Big Deals foundered 
on the faulty premise underlying the model, 
which is predicated on the maintenance of a 
library’s expenditure at the point of time in 
which it signs on to the agreement (its “his-
torical spend”), plus an annual percentage 
increase.  The faulty premise is that our budget 
would continue, at least on average, to increase 
enough to meet the Big Deals’ increases.  This 
did not happen, as it did not and still does not 
happen for many institutions — probably for 
the majority of the 106 Highers like us.  
In practice, because the Deals’ annual in-
creases exceeded the increases in the Library’s 
budget, they were consuming an ever larger 
share of our budget.  In 2004, we spent 24% 
of our budget on these Deals; by 2008, the 
figure had risen to 33%.  This, in turn, meant 
less money for the universe of resources avail-
able for us to choose from — even while that 
universe is always expanding.  There are two 
costs associated with this: the cutting of the 
Library’s existing resources to compensate, 
and the opportunity cost of not adding new 
resources because the budget is squeezed and 
there is no additional funding available.  As-
sessments of the value of Big Deals (discussed 
further below) that do not include these costs 
fail to present the whole story.
They also ignore the big picture — the im-
pact of Big Deals on the scholarly publishing 
marketplace as a whole.  The costs mentioned 
above also reverberate in the marketplace, 
since institutions locked into Big Deals are 
spending less elsewhere.  Where 
do libraries go to find offsets 
for the increasing costs of 
the Big Deals?  To those 
publishers and vendors 
who do not operate on 
that model, particularly 
academic and profession-
al societies, university 
presses, and independent 
publishers.  This has the 
effect of forcing these 
publishers, who are not 
driven by the search for 
profit and who charge lower subscription prices 
than do commercial publishers, to consider 
other arrangements for their publishing, all 
too often resulting in their consumption by 
the commercial publishers.  There are diverse 
reasons for smaller publishers to pursue such 
a move, but one important consideration is 
the guaranteed subscription base (and hence 
income) provided by libraries’ participation in 
Big Deals.  We are indisputably contributing 
to market consolidation, which results in ever 
higher prices for all of us.  
Leaving the Big Deals levels the playing 
field for all publishers and vendors in our 
collection development decisions.  We decide, 
of course channeling the preferences of the 
University community, what we will buy or 
subscribe to, based on all those traditional and 
developing factors and metrics that librarians 
have at their disposal.  This allows us to devel-
op a true freedom collection.
Locally, then, an important outcome of 
leaving Big Deals is the increased flexibility 
and control over the collection gained, since 
less of the budget is tied up in arrangements 
that lock in an ever-increasing obligation. 
Unfortunately, in these times of scarcity, the 
flexibility we have achieved is measured out 
not in what new products we can add, but which 
existing resources we will cut.  Nevertheless, 
the problem would be exacerbated if we had 
maintained our Deals — the estimate is that 
we save annually between 
$300,000 and $400,000 
(depending on what an-
nual increase percentage 
is used) since our depar-
ture;  that is the amount we 
would we paying each and 
every year to the three pub-
lishers above what we are 
paying now, if we had not 
left the Deals.  The figure 
would of course increase 
every year.  To compensate for this 
difference, we would be forced to 
cut other resources, not because they are less 
valuable, but because they are not protected by 
similar agreements.  To put it in perspective, 
this is about the amount we spend on books 
each year.
Greater flexibility is also achieved in the 
ability to adjust our current subscriptions from 
the Big Deal publishers, since we are not con-
tractually bound to maintain our current spend. 
Optimal pricing is achieved on an annual basis 
if we do maintain our subscriptions, but we have 
